

Slovenia

	<p>An organization, dealing with sealed sources, used in industrial radiography, including transport – without an appointed dangerous goods safety advisor (DGSA)</p>
<p>Date and location of the event (detection)</p>	<p>September 2014, South-eastern Slovenia</p>
<p>Mode of transport</p>	<p>Road</p>
<p>Type of package involved</p>	<p>Type B package(s)</p>
<p>Radioactive material transported</p>	<p>Sealed sources, used in industrial radiography</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Description of the event</p>	
<p>On the margin of a Euratom “safeguards” inspection at the premises of a company, dealing with in industrial radiography (depleted uranium, shielding), SNSA’s staff asked the company’s (by the way) also on an appointed dangerous goods safety advisor (DGSA). The company was not aware about this legislative’s requirements.</p>	
	<p>Pictures (if any)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Actual consequences</p>	
<p>Some months later, SNSA carried out an inspection at that company, addressing mainly “radiation practices and use of sources”. It was also revealed that the company still had not appointed DGSA. The SNSA’s inspector required the appointment and complying with the national/international transport-related legislation.</p> <p>Not harsher “penalties” were given at that time as an “oral warning” – and the company appointed DGSA in 2015.</p> <p>Particularly in 2019 (after the company’s radiation protection officer was changed), the company has achieved a tangible progress in all aspects of dealing with radioactive sources.</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">Main causes of the events</p>	
<p>The company was not fully familiar with ADR’s requirements (DGSA and his/her duties, including trainings and knowledge-sharing with drivers/employees). The company had been dealing with industrial radiography, using only X-ray devices, till 2013.</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">Summary of actions adopted</p>	

- 1) Step by step, SNSA has “accumulated” solid experience about the use and transport of radioactive sources in/through Slovenia. Transport-related topics are included into quarterly published “Radiation News” at times.
- 2) In 2017, SNSA established a group of national stakeholders, with annual meetings, to pro-actively address safety (and security) during transport of Class 7.
- 3) Future activities (of SNSA) will also touch upon other aspects of ADR-related requirements, e.g. duties of consignees, security, actual transport of “excepted packages”, air transport, etc.; some dedicated, topic-related scientific visits to a more advanced EACA member in this regard might be outlined.

Main lessons learned

Awareness of transport stakeholders, dedicated inspections, cooperation with the Police, possible occasional joint inspection with the Slovenian Radiation Safety Administration, sharing of good (and bad) practices during courses for drivers and DGSAs, etc.